Let us consider the public market, or bazaar, the primary economic institution of the medieval world and even today a common sight in the developing world. After verbal agreement between seller and buyer is reached, the seller hands over the goods and the buyer hands over the money. The quid and the quo are exchanged simultaneously. But, as Greif put it, suppose the quid and the quo are separated.
1 They can be separated in time,
as when the buyer promises to pay later but wants to take the goods with him. What will then give the seller confidence that he will be paid as promised? In the absence of law (or, as we shall see, some ongoing relationship between seller and buyer), the seller is likely to simply refuse to sell except against money pressed into his hand. The same problem arises where goods are to be made to order with the seller requiring advance payment. These problems were compounded in the medieval world when the buyer and the seller were geographically separated. True, seller and buyer could negotiate in writing or through a traveling agent. But the separation in place meant that the goods would have to be produced and delivered before payment could be expected, the seller thereby taking what he might well consider an unreasonable risk that the buyer would change his mind.
Or payment could be made before the goods were produced, in which case it is the buyer who took the risk.
In these cases, the quid and the quo were separated in both space and time. Of course, most goods were simply taken physically to distant bazaars where they were offered for sale. The problem for the seller in that situation was twofold. If he was cheated in the bazaar, he had to trust the local authorities to protect him and not to discriminate against him as a foreigner. And second he would normally have to choose some kind of agent to act for him. If the agent absconded with his goods or with the payment received in exchange, the producer's remedies might be limited.
These kinds of problems were acute in the Middle Ages, not so much within the city states that were the dominant economies of the time in Europe but whenever long distance trade had to be carried on. 2 The city states had domestic legal systems 3 , but they could not easily enforce contracts in which their citizens were cheated when selling or buying goods in distant city states. And so inter-city trade was limited. These kinds of problems extended beyond trade and its financing to purely financial contracts and insurance contracts, both of which necessarily had the same separation between the quid and the quo as the trade examples.
1 Greif (2004a) . 2 Greif (2004b) . 3 Smith (1928, p. 213-216) .
Even where the parties were bargaining in good faith, the separation of the quid and the quo created the possibility that one party, however well-intentioned ex ante, would find it to his advantage ex post to reopen the bargaining or simply welsh on the deal. This incentive to renegotiate agreements after one party had performed, a common occurrence even today, can be referred to as ex post opportunism; it creates severe economic inefficiencies whenever an adequate legal system is not in place. In other words, the enforcement of contracts is important to assure that contracts will be performed voluntarily.
As we will see throughout this book, these kinds of problems exist across the entire spectrum of economic activities whenever a system of law is not in place or does not work effectively to give parties confidence that contracts will be carried out. This is the essence of the Rule of Law problem in many developing countries where the legal system does not, for whatever reason, work effectively.
Nevertheless, some trade can take place even though the quid and quo are 
Early European Substitutes for the Rule of Law: Boycotts and Reputation
In considering the evolution of long-distance trade in Europe in the Middle Ages, one must recognize, however, that even in that period some solutions had been found to these kinds of problems, at least in certain instances. The solutions, however, illustrate why a Rule of law is essential to the efficient functioning of a modern economy.
One early solution was the Community Responsibility System. 6 Under this system 4 Baird et al (1994, p. 203) . 5 Bardhan (2000, p. 219-220); Redding (1990) . 6 The description of this System draws heavily on Grief (2004a) and earlier Greif articles cited therein. See also Greif (2004b) . city states (communities) would hold all members of a foreign community responsible when any member of that foreign community cheated, or failed to pay a debt to, a local citizen. If the foreigner refused compensation, goods of that foreigner's compatriots within the local community would simply be impounded for the benefit of the local citizen. In effect, the presence of a debtor's compatriots provided de facto collateral. The System worked because the debtor's community would be motivated, in view of its dependence on long distance trade, to force its own citizen-debtor to pay because trade opportunities would otherwise be limited by what amounted to a boycott by the creditor's community. The System worked for both trade in goods and for financial transactions.
The System was, however, imperfect. In a sense the sanction was too powerful. In the first place, impoundment of goods of all foreigners from a given city disrupted trade between the two cities, at least until the dispute was settled. Nearby city states therefore sometimes entered into treaties to regulate the implementation of the System, as in the Pisa-Florence Treaty of 1214.
7 And the sanction was too strong in a further sense; it gave the local creditor less reason to investigate the creditworthiness of his counterpart foreign debtor before entering into the transaction.
Clearly third-party enforcement would have been preferable to the Community Responsibility System. But there was no appropriate third party available where the two communities were not subject to a common sovereign. Neither Italy nor Germany had a single ruler because they were not unified states. In England under the Normans a centralized legal system was created in Westminster covering the part of England subject to royal control through traveling judges, but it was a costly and uncertain form of thirdparty enforcement, and so the Community Responsibility System played a role in England as well. 8 An effort was made in England to create an alternative adjudication system. The
Statute of Westminster I of 1275 outlawed the Community Responsibility System among communities within England by declaring that "no stranger who is of this kingdom is to 7 Greif (2004a, p. 130, n. 58). 8 In 1166 "a system of sending royal judges from the center to go on circuit through the counties" was established." Danziger and Gillingham (2003, p. 186-187) . In view of the common belief that in the Middle Ages only churchmen could read and write it is worth noting that the overwhelming majority of this new class of judges were laymen, men learned in a law which depended for its regular functioning upon documents. Everywhere they went these judges applied the same laws, a common law all over England, which is why the king who sent them out is commonly regarded as the founder of the Common Law." (p. 189) This practice was similar to "circuit riding" in the United States. In early U.S. Supreme Court history "riding circuit for justices meant bouncing thousands of miles over rutted, dirt roads in stagecoach, on horseback, and in stick gigs to bring the federal judiciary to the American communities strewn along the Eastern seaboard. More so than the representatives of the federal postal system, the justices appeared despite rain, snow, sleet, and the hazards of traveling." Baker (1976 The example just cited involved boycotts, but other systems were adopted in the period prior to the nation state that were based not on boycotts but rather on reputation.
Just as local traders within a town could rely on local knowledge and experience based on past trading (in other words on reputation), additional means were established to build on the reputation concept. The Maghribi traders system was geographically localized in the Mediterranean world and disappeared by the end of the eleventh century. But a different system, also based on reputation, was being created in Northern Europe. This was the Law Merchant.
It was not a system of law enacted by a legislature or handed down by a ruler, and therefore some scholars are reluctant to call it "law." 14 But it worked! Trading communities, normally guilds, established their own private tribunals. The law they adopted to govern commercial transactions was initially rooted in the rules followed in the most developed European cities of the time, the Italian city states, and was more or less uniform across Europe. But it was private law established and applied by private tribunals. One can call it customary law, but it was custom of a different kind than the customary law applied in small communities across Europe for local matters such as inheritance.
The Law Merchant can be seen as based on reputation because it was created and applied by merchants and was more or less uniform across northern Europe. Any word that a Law Merchant decision had been flouted by a particular merchant would result in the destruction of that merchant's reputation for honesty and hence he would not be trusted in long distance trade or credit transactions. Moreover, the fact that merchants knew and applied this standard law meant that word of a decision could be communicated simply and could be expected to travel quickly. Moreover, the Law Merchant grew beyond simple sales to include credit, bills of exchange, insurance and other trade-promoting legal devices.
A system related to the Law Merchant was used to promote honesty and fair 13 Greif (1989) . 14 See for example, Donahue (2004) and Kadens (2004) . See also comments in Epstein (2004, p. 3), which states that "the debate is as much about the definition of law as it is about the historical origins and development of the Law Merchant itself." dealing at fairs (in Champagne and elsewhere in Western Europe), which were one of the principal means of long distance trade during this period. At these fairs buyers and sellers met, normally once a year. A number of localities held fairs. 15 We know that the fairs had means of resolving disputes that arose at fair time, and we have some detail about the Flanders fairs, which had their own legal system. Beginning in 1252, foreign merchants were exempted from trial by combat and from reprisals; only their personal goods could be confiscated, although imprisonment for debt was permitted. But the important point was that any case involving a merchant had to be judged within a week. Cases, once brought, could not be delayed or adjourned. In short, disputes were resolved before the parties left the fair. It seems likely that a defendant would find it difficult to leave earlier or, if he succeeded in leaving, ever to return in view of the power of the authorities to exclude merchants from fairs. Moreover, many towns sent consuls to fairs to represent their own merchants in disputes before fair courts. 16 And some towns established their own courts at distant fairs: a Flemish guild court traveled with Flemish merchants to handle internal disputes among the Flemish merchants at fairs in England.
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The Nation State
The development of the nation state in Europe provided a means to solve long distance trade problems. These nation states were monarchies, and the monarch had not only the means to create courts that could coerce compliance with contracts but also some motivation to promote trade, which meant some incentive to treat foreign traders fairly.
With growth of nation states the problems of long distance trade began to be resolved but only to the extent that the parties were subject to the same government. However, even in England, which had an early start with the Norman conquest and the centralization of the English court system in Westminster, 18 it took a long period for the legal system to evolve to support even the rudiments of what we take for granted as necessary for a modern economy, with secured credit, business enterprises in corporate form, and markets in shares. Moreover, the existence of a monarch with nominal sovereignty over large areas did not mean that the writ of his judges necessarily ran so broadly. One has only to read Shakespeare's historical plays to realize that the rebellion of regional nobility was a repeated occurrence and a constant preoccupation in England.
15 Pirenne (1937) . 16 The foregoing paragraph is based on Postan et al. (1965, p. 132-137) . 17 Moore (1985, p. 96-99) . 18 Milsom (1969, (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) .
In short, even with the rise of the nation state, the ability of a King's courts to protect long distance trade must have been largely theoretical for some centuries as justice remained mostly local. 19 For example, even in a country as relatively centralized as France the law remained based on local custom for centuries and was not fully unified until Napoleon. And as long as justice was local, the temptation to favor local merchants over traders from distant parts, even merchants of the same kingdom, presented problems for the growth of long distance trade and the development of modern financial and insurance techniques. Flourishing foreign trade requires protection against discrimination in the enforcement of contracts and the protection of property.
Germany and Italy did not even become unified nations until the nineteenth century. Much as we may admire the legal systems of present day developed countries, those legal systems have evolved a great deal. Even England, which was perhaps the first European country to achieve geographical unity, had a number of competing court systems. These different courts might produce different outcomes in factually similar disputes. A prime example would be the difference between outcomes in Common Pleas, a common law court, and Chancery, a tribunal designed to "do equity" -in short, to provide a remedy not available at common law. 20 There were, moreover, various prerogative courts that enforced rules proclaimed by the King independent of Parliament or the common law in the exercise of the King's prerogative powers.
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Predation and the Rule of Law Dilemma
With the growing power of monarchs came not just court systems but also a new threat to the Rule of Law. The monarch himself might disavow his own contracts or seize property of a subject for his own purposes. Today we sometimes see in authoritarian regimes in the developing world what we may call predatory rulers. And predatory is exactly what a number of European monarchs were in earlier centuries.
Social scientists sometimes describe the resulting Rule of Law dilemma in the following terms. A ruler strong enough to enforce contracts and protect private property is also strong enough to take predatory action against subjects. 22 If citizens cannot trust their government to keep its hands off their property, they are unlikely to invest as much, 19 In the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries "'pleas concerning the debt of laymen…belong[ed] to the crown and dignity of the lord king'" and therefore were nominally within the jurisdiction of the courts, but "'private agreements'" were "not customarily dealt with by the king's courts." Ibbetson (1999, p. 17) . 20 Hanbury and Maudsley (1989 and what we might today call "oligarchs."
That today's developed countries have largely solved not just the quid and the quo problem but also the predatory ruler problem is not the result of the work of great legal scholars or brilliant legal architects. On the contrary, the transition to a Rule of Law state has in most countries been the result of an evolution over several centuries.
Legal Evolution in England
The evolution in England has been the best documented of these transitions. These fundamental changes are today called the Glorious Revolution, not just because they were essentially bloodless but also because they created a constitutional foundation for assuring that the English monarchy was no longer in a position to be predatory.
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Today social scientists refer to these changes as creating a "credible commitment" that English rulers would no longer take their subjects' property without compensation nor repudiate their debts. Parliament's power vis-à-vis the Crown was made clearer in the 1701 Act of Settlement, which regulated the succession to the monarchy. 43 Thereafter, the monarchy became a statutory office in the sense not just that its powers were circumscribed by legislation but that even the person to succeed to that position would be determined, albeit perhaps indirectly, by the legislature.
44
More important still for the Rule of Law was a provision of the 1701 Act of Settlement that further defined the separation of powers by establishing the basis for an independent judiciary. The Act gave judges life tenure on good behavior, 45 thereby ending a pattern in which the Crown had threatened judges in key cases and dismissed them when threats failed. 46 Soon thereafter salaries of judges became fixed during their tenure, and they could be dismissed only if convicted of a criminal offense or by "the address of both houses" (similar to the U.S. impeachment process). 47 These major steps toward an independent judiciary supplemented earlier measures to limit or eliminate the prerogative tribunals controlled by the Crown. The Star Chamber had been used, until 38 Thompson (1938, p. 198) . 43 Plucknett (1960, p. 504 Other steps creating a modern separation of powers were designed to give Parliament independence from royal arbitrariness. Parliament, by the Triennial Act of 1694, now met in regular sessions, assuring that it could not be sent home for long periods when its majority was opposed to the Crown or kept in session for long periods when Parliamentary majorities favored the Crown. 54 Though the Triennial Act set a limit to the length of any particular Parliament and assured that the Parliament would meet at least every three years, the previously mentioned provisions on the King's income and expenditures were perhaps more important because they changed the incentives so that it was now in the King's interest to see that a Parliament was in session at least every year. 55 Weingast (1997b, p. 220) . 54 Plucknett (1960, p. 526) . 55 Kemp (1957, p. 32-36) . The Triennial Act states: "That from henceforth a parliament shall be holden once in three years at the least"; and "That from henceforth no parliament … shall at any time hereafter be called, assembled or held, shall have any continuance longer than for three years only at the farthest." Quoted in Williams (1960, Constitution of 1787. Both the English and U.S. systems represented a balance between legislative and executive powers, providing an answer to the predatory ruler problem, and a further balance achieved through an independent judiciary. 58 In the case of England the Glorious Revolution provided a strong base for later enjoyment of the fruits of the industrial revolution and for an economic evolution that made England arguably the wealthiest country in the world for a considerable period of time.
elections and turnover. Kemp (1957, 39-40 Holmes (1993, p. 222) . 58 The Act of Settlement of 1701 did not provide security of tenure to judges during the lifetime of the appointing King. This exception was eliminated in 1761. Klerman and Mahoney (2005, p. 11-12) .
Assessing the Glorious Revolution
The Glorious Revolution has been celebrated by economists largely for its role in enabling the British Crown to borrow to finance wars. A broader and ultimately more important perspective, however, concerns the creation of a Rule-of-Law state, which has broader development implications.
The large volume of recent studies examining interest rates and other financial indicators in the period after the Glorious Revolution to determine the financial effects of the Glorious Revolution is important but somewhat beside the point. Interest rates fell, though there is debate about how soon, how much, and for how long they fell. 59 Certainly the creation of a new international debt market in English government securities was somewhat of a hit-and-miss affair. 60 But the ability of the English sovereign to borrow new money at all was noteworthy in view of the earlier behavior of the Stuart Kings.
Especially remarkable was the ability to borrow to the extent of increasing the debt seventeenfold between 1688 and 1697. 61 One reason was that Parliament greatly increased taxes, thereby cementing, in the famous phrase of North and Weingast, a "credible commitment that the Crown would not default." 62 A land tax was introduced that raised large amounts of revenue. But the important point was that the land tax was voted by the same landed classes that controlled Parliament, thereby signifying that Parliament was prepared to pay for the wars that were engulfing England.
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The larger accomplishment for future centuries of these great constitutional events surrounding the Glorious Revolution was, as already noted, the creation of a functioning Rule of Law, the first in the world. 64 And these accomplishments paid off. only 25 percent. 65 North gives credit to the rise of the power of Parliament that "caused the nature of English property rights to diverge from the Continental pattern." Crown. These rules enabled Britain in the eighteenth century not only to enjoy faster growth of the economy but also led the way into the Industrial Revolution.
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Constitutions
Although the Glorious Revolution is primarily to be seen as creating a constitutional structure, it is important to observe that it did not result, as most revolutions do today, in a single written document and certainly not one that those One completely different constitutional issue that has some bearing on economic development is federalism. In some cases federalism can contribute to economic growth. 74 By the time of Napoleon it meant the aristocratic practice of primogeniture, which by assuring that only the eldest son inherited land assured the survival of landed estates in the same families generation after generation and hence the perpetuation of the aristocracy's wealth and thereby its power. 75 Napoleon's solution in the Code Civil was to require the division of property at death among all children. 76 A person with children could dispose of only one-tenth of his property by will. 77 The obvious purpose was revolution by evolution: over several generations the great landed estates would be divided and subdivided and the aristocracy would lose its prestige and power. One perhaps not so minor detail is that the 1791 Constitution also stated that only one hierarchical feature from the past would not be abolished: "…nor any other superiority [was to be allowed] than that of public functionaries in the performance of their functions." 78 This can be interpreted as a belief in the bureaucratic state, with an emphasis on the public sector; that particular revolutionary heritage may be more important historically than the Code Civil. Indeed, even without the exaltation of the public functionary, the draftsmen's intent to eliminate all prior law had a similar consequence. Merryman concludes that even during the more temperate postrevolutionary days of the Civil Code, there was a sub-text that underlay the declared purpose of writing on a clean slate:
[O]ne reason for the attempt to repeal all prior law, and thus limit the effect of law to new legislation, was statism-the glorification of the nation-state. A law that had its origin in an earlier time, before the creation of the state, violated this statist ideal. So did a law that had its origin outside the state-in a European common law, for instance.
Thus, if the origin of public law may be at least as important as the origin of private law, this underlying theory of French constitutional arrangements with its background of glorifying the nation state and the public functionary may well be more important for economic development than anything one can actually read in the Code Civil.
One important fact is that it took a good long time to eliminate all aspects of feudal land ownership in the present developing world. Take Latin America as an example: It was not just that French private law was not adopted in Latin America for many decades after independence. In addition, even though French law may have been an influence, the French Code Civil was rarely adopted outright. Rather Spanish law and Roman law, perhaps more supportive of feudal ideas, played a role in Latin America. In doing so, this cafeteria approach helped to perpetuate the societal role of the descendants of the early Spanish and Portuguese settlers. 80 When we come to modern times, we should certainly not assume that the spirit and theory of the property changes wrought by the French Code Civil would determine the protection accorded by Latin American governments to newer forms of property, such as rights in intangible property or shareholder rights.
The same counterintuitive story about protection of property can be told about the French Revolutionary draftsmen's intentions with regard to "freedom of contract." What that phrase meant in practice was that certain limitations on contracts that came largely from the influence of the Church were invalidated. A prime example was the abolition of usury restrictions on contracts. If there was to be freedom of contract, then legal restrictions on the rate of interest could not be tolerated. 81 But this element of French revolutionary law was later abandoned. A final aspect of the Code Civil bearing on the Rule of Law is that it was drafted in the context of other changes designed to reduce the role of the judiciary to a mechanical interpretive role in order to avoid gouvernment des juges and assure the dominance of the legislature. The judges were simply to apply the enactments of the legislature to the letter, just as a bureaucrat would be expected to do. Whether a judiciary with such a limited role can assure the Rule of Law is an important question.
One can conclude that although at a superficial level, the emphasis on property and freedom of contract might seem to be the keystones of a move toward the Rule of Law, especially in the simple-minded modern "protect property rights" and "enforce contracts" version, the French Civil and Commercial Codes (and one could argue at greater length, civil law in general) do not necessarily equate to the Rule of Law. More is required.
